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Abstract
Where there are alternative roads to the same destination, compe-
tition between proﬁt maximizing road operators is possible. Tolls
on such roads could perform two welfare enhancing functions; dis-
couraging excessive driving and allocating drivers between roads.
The second of these functions will typically require some roads
to be more expensive to drive on, and to be less congested, than
others. Bertrand equilibrium will not always peform this second
function. It may fail to allocate the most impatient drivers to less
congested roads, as it does not always deliver toll diﬀerentiation.
The performance of this second function is dependent on the ﬁrst.
That is, whether or not competing roads will be diﬀerentiated by
tolls and congestion, will depend in part on the importance of
discouraging marginal drivers. The equilibrium will not gener-
ally be fully eﬃcient, but will often provide eﬃciency gains over
other decentralized options.
Key Words: congestion, road pricing, networks, market struc-
ture
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When motorists do not have to pay to use roads, they may not have incentives
to drive eﬃciently. One reason is well understood. Too many people may
choose to drive, and drive too much, because they don’t take into account
the increased congestion experienced by other drivers. However, there is
also a second reason. Impatient drivers may be willing to pay more, to
use ‘Lexus lanes’ or roads with minimal congestion. Toll diﬀerentiation can
increase welfare, by encouraging patient and impatient drivers to select roads
with high and low congestion respectively (Verhoef & Small 1999, Small &
Yan 2001, Parry 2002).
One approach to pricing congestion is to allow private companies to op-
erate roads and toll drivers. For example, a single private company might
operate both roads. A private company might operate one road and the
other road might not be tolled. Or competing ﬁrms might each operate one
of the roads. Verhoef & Small (1999) examined the ﬁrst two of these three
options, with results that were discouraging. Both options reduced eﬃciency
from a benchmark of no tolls.
The current paper examines the third option, competition. Unfortu-
nately, no general result on the eﬃciency consequences is available. This
is not surprising as even a single-road monopolist might charge an eﬃcient
toll (Edelson 1971). However, an example is presented, in which duopoly out-
performs untolled roads as well as the other two options mentioned above.
Recall the two ways that tolls can raise eﬃciency; discouraging excessive
driving and allocating drivers between roads. Competition will typically de-
liver positive tolls, and hence perform the ﬁrst function. But the prospects
for the second function are not so clear. The following discussion ex-
1amines whether toll diﬀerentiation is required for eﬃciency, and
whether it can be expected as a result of a duopoly equilibrium.
It is a standard result that Bertrand competition between providers of
non-diﬀerentiated goods leads to a symmetric equilibrium (all ﬁrms charge
the same price) and to eﬃciency. But this result is not applicable to con-
gestible networks. The reason is that otherwise identical networks have
diﬀerent levels of congestion when they charge diﬀerent prices (H¨ ackner
& Nyberg 1996). Engel, Fischer & Galetovic (1999) examine a roading
oligopoly, ﬁnding that equilibria are not generally eﬃcient. de Palma &
Lindsey (2000) present an example in which a duopoly equilibrium is more
eﬃcient than one or both roads being untolled.
Previous research does not provide a compelling reason to expect com-
peting roads to deliver diﬀerent levels of congestion. de Palma &
Lindsey (2000), H¨ ackner & Nyberg (1996) and Lee & Mason (2001) all ﬁnd
symmetric equilibria. However none of these studies address the same ques-
tion as the current paper. de Palma and Lindsey consider queue rather ﬂow
congestion. While queue congestion is a suitable assumption for some issues,
it is not appropriate for examining diﬀerentiation between high and low con-
gestion roads. de Palma and Lindsey’s duopolists charge time varying tolls
that completely remove congestion. Furthermore, the beneﬁts from diﬀeren-
tiation, identiﬁed by Verhoef and Small, are not relevant when drivers are
homogeneous. H¨ ackner & Nyberg (1996) ﬁnd that equilibria must be sym-
metric if there are only two ﬁrms or if the disutility of congestion is only
signiﬁcant for high levels of utilitization. However, like de Palma & Lindsey,
they assume homogeneous consumers.
Lee & Mason (2001) do allow consumers to have heterogeneous prefer-
2ences, and do not assume that congestion takes the form of queues. They also
ﬁnd there will always be a symmetric equilibrium. Furthermore, they argue
that competition in congested networks cannot deliver asymmetric equilibria.
However, they assume that ﬁrms do not anticipate that changes in tolls will
aﬀect drivers’ expectations about congestion.2
Previous literature has identiﬁed beneﬁts from toll diﬀerentiation, but
does not suggest that competition will deliver such beneﬁts. Models of com-
petition either do not incorporate all beneﬁts, predict no diﬀerentiation in
equilibrium, or both. In the following discussion, the possibility of toll dif-
ferentiation is re-examined in a Bertrand model of a roading duopoly. It will
be assumed that roads are subject to ﬂow rather than queue congestion, that
drivers (and sometimes roads) are heterogeneous and that drivers anticipate
more expensive roads to be less congested.
Unfortunately, heterogeneous drivers and rational expectations are not
easy to model. A ﬁrm’s payoﬀ need not be quasi-concave in its toll, and its
best-response may be discontinuous (Verhoef & Small 1999, Lee & Mason
2001). Furthermore, games will not generally be supermodular. As a result,
pure strategy equilibria need not exist. In addition, the analysis can be
intractable. However, it is possible to obtain some results.
The assumptions of the model are outlined in the following section. Sec-
tion 3 focuses on the second function of tolls - allocating drivers among roads
- and abstracts from decisions about whether to drive at all. In this frame-
work, some toll diﬀerentiation would be welfare improving, but unregulated
duopoly may not deliver it. Even when competition does lead to toll dif-
2They emphasize applications in which this assumption is reasonable, such
as when ﬁrms cannot commit to prices in advance.
3ferentiation, the wrong road may be more expensive. However these
pessimistic results depend on the absence of marginal consumers, who are
introduced in section 4. An equilibrium will not generally deliver a ﬁrst best
outcome, but we can expect some toll diﬀerentiation when tolls actively re-
duce the amount of driving. An example is presented in section 5, illustrating
the symmetric equilibria of section 3 and the asymmetric equilibria of section
4. Conclusions are drawn in section 6.
2 The model
Two roads connect the same two points. Each road is owned by a diﬀerent
ﬁrm. Firms 1 and 2 simultaneously choose tolls p1 ∈ R+ and p2 ∈ R+ respec-
tively. Firms incur no extra costs from more drivers, and so ﬁrms maximize
revenues. Consumers observe the announced tolls and then simultaneously
choose which if any of the roads to drive on.
The two roads have utilization Q1 and Q2. Congestion is an increasing
and diﬀerentiable function of utilization, i.e., z0
i(Qi) > 0. Roads are hetero-
geneous when z1(·) and z2(·) are diﬀerent functions.
Consumers are heterogeneous but anonymous. That is, they diﬀer accord-
ing to their disutility from congestion, but this disutility does not depend on
the identity of other drivers on the road. A consumer in group i with taste
parameter θi receives utility ui(z;θi)−p from driving on a road with conges-
tion z and paying a toll of p. She receives a reservation utility of uo if she
does not drive.
Utility from travel is twice diﬀerentiable in z and θi, strictly decreasing
in z and has a negative cross partial derivative. That is, motorists
4are willing to pay to avoid congestion, and motorists with higher
values of θi are willing to pay more. In principle, a strong aversion
to congestion could be either positively or negatively related to the
value of travel. It could be the most patient or the most impatient
that choose not to drive. We allow for both possibilities by dividing
motorists into i = 1,..,n subpopulations, where ui(z,θi) is increasing
in θi for some subpopulations i and decreasing for others. Subpop-
ulation i has mass µi. The taste parameter, θi, is distributed according
to Fi, which is continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly increasing on [0,1].
Although homogeneity of drivers is ruled out by the assumption that Fi is
increasing, it will be possible to examine some implications of homogeneity.
3 Results when everyone prefers to drive
If uo is high enough, then some consumers will not drive in equilibrium. But
in this section, we consider the case in which uo is so low that everyone
strictly prefers to drive. In this case, the only function that tolls need to
perform is to allocate drivers between roads. The eﬃcient allocation requires
diﬀerent tolls to be charged on the two roads.
Proposition 1 Assume that p1 = p2 and every driver strictly prefers to
drive. The outcome will not be a local total surplus maximum.
The proof is presented in Appendix C. But the intuition is straight-
forward. If both roads charge the same toll, then they will also have the
same level of congestion. Otherwise drivers would switch to the less con-
gested road. In an eﬃcient outcome, each driver would impose the same
5marginal external cost on other drivers, no matter which road she chose.
The two roads will not generally have the same marginal externality when
they are equally congested, if either roads or drivers are heterogeneous. So
it will not be eﬃcient for roads to be equally congested.
Consider the case in which drivers are homogeneous but roads are het-
erogeneous. All drivers would have the same willingness to pay to reduce
congestion. Total surplus would vary inversely with aggregate congestion,
z1 · Q1 + z2 · Q2. So long as the two roads have diﬀerent elasticities of con-
gestion with respect to utilization when z1 = z2, aggregate congestion can
be reduced by moving drivers to the road with the lower elasticity. This
reallocation of drivers can only be accomplished by diﬀerentiating the tolls.
Now consider the case in which roads are homogeneous, but drivers diﬀer
from each other. In this case, the ﬁndings of Verhoef & Small (1999) apply.
Impatient drivers are willing to pay enough to compensate patient drivers
for using the other road. Again there would be gains to price diﬀerentiation.
Although toll diﬀerentiation is required for eﬃciency, it need not result
from competition. This is particularly clear when the roads are identical.
Proposition 2 Assume that the two roads are identical (i.e. that z1(·) ≡
z2(·)). Assume further that there is a pure strategy Bertrand equilibrium in
which every consumer strictly prefers driving to staying at home. Then both
ﬁrms will charge the same toll, and have the same level of congestion.
To see why this proposition holds, consider how the equilibrium
is determined. Because of the assumption that higher θi implies
stronger aversion to congestion, motorists’ choices between the two
roads can be characterized with thresholds. Let θi
M be the thresh-
6old for subpopulation i, so that motorists with θi > θi
M will prefer
to drive on the less congested and more expensive road and those
with θi < θi
M will prefer the more congested one. Then θi
M is char-





M) = p2 − p1 (1)












The tolls only enter equation (1) in terms of the toll diﬀerence,
and so dQ2/dp1 = −dQ2/dp2. Equation (2) implies that dQ1/dp1 =
−dQ2/dp1. By transitivity, it follows that dQ1/dp1 = dQ2/dp2. This








to imply that Q1/p1 = Q2/p2. This means that if p1 < p2, then Q1 < Q2.
But if the roads are identical, this is impossible. It would mean that some
drivers were choosing road 2 even though it was more expensive and more
congested. So there cannot be an equilibrium with p1 < p2, or by a similar
argument, with p1 > p2.
The problem is more general than just with identical roads. If there is
an asymmetric equilibrium, the more expensive road must have higher uti-
lization. This is clearly impossible if the roads are identical, but it may be
3unless everyone in the subpopulation strictly prefers one of the two roads. Such
subpopulations do not aﬀect the result
7suboptimal even when it is possible. Imagine that one road has greater ca-
pacity than the other. Eﬃciency may require the larger road to be more
expensive, or it may require the smaller road to be more expensive. It de-
pends on the elasticities of congestion and on the distributions, Fi. But only
the former type of outcome could be a competitive equilibrium.
Proposition 2 supports the pessimism about asymmetric equilibria ex-
pressed by H¨ ackner & Nyberg (1996), de Palma & Lindsey (2000), and Lee
& Mason (2001). However, it does rely on a strong assumption. The
prospect of staying at home is so unattractive, that everyone will choose to
drive. This assumption is critical, and will be relaxed in the following section.
4 Results when not everyone drives
We now allow some potential drivers to stay at home. Non-drivers are
divided from drivers by the thresholds θi
L and θi
M. In subpopula-
tions in which ui(z,θi) is increasing in θi, high θi motorists always
drive (θi
H = 1), but low θi motorists may not. If they do all drive,
then θi
L = 0. Otherwise, the motorist with θi = θi
L is indiﬀerent
whether or not to drive; ui(z1,θi
L) − p1 = u0. Conversely, when util-
ity is decreasing in θi, low θi motorists always drive (θi
L = 0), but
high θi motorists may not (ui(z2,θi
H) − p2 = u0 or θi
H = 0). As a

























Toll diﬀerentiation is still required for eﬃciency.
8Proposition 3 If the two tolls are equal, the outcome is not eﬃcient.
The eﬃcient tolls maximise total surplus.
















































An increase in p2 will sometimes increase total surplus, and some-
times decrease it. But, it is shown in Appendix C, that if we start
from the highest total surplus that is attainable without toll dif-
ferentiation, then surplus increases further when one of the tolls is
increased incrementally.
Proposition 3 is analogous to proposition 1. A symmetric outcome con-
tinues to be ineﬃcient, even when some potential drivers choose to stay at
home. However, there is no analog for proposition 2. Competing duopolists
may charge diﬀerent tolls, even when roads are identical.
Proposition 4 Assume that the two roads are identical. Any pure strategy
Bertrand equilibrium, in which some people do not drive, is asymmetric.
This proposition is demonstrated in Appendix D. The rationale is that
there is an upward kink in the demand curve when p1 = p2, and hence
an upward jump of marginal revenue. This means that there cannot be a
proﬁt maximum at this point, and so the two ﬁrms charge diﬀerent tolls in
equilibrium. Recall that the rationale for proposition 2 was based
on an identity between ∂Q1/∂p1 and ∂Q2/∂p2. This identity will not
9generally hold when higher tolls convince some potential drivers to
stay at home.4
Although Bertrand duopoly can deliver toll diﬀerentiation, and hence
some beneﬁts, it does not generally deliver an eﬃcient outcome. Eﬃcient
tolls reﬂect the disutility of congestion experienced by inframarginal drivers.
In contrast, competing duopolists only care about marginal drivers - those
at the thresholds. Although we do not have an analytic result about the
eﬃciency consequences of duopoly, it is possible to calculate equilibrium tolls
for simple examples. One such example is illustrated in the following section.
5 A simple example
Assume two identical roads and a single population, in which θ is
distributed uniformly on [0,1]. Utility from driving is θ·(1−Q)−p. As a
consequence, θM is determined in the following counterpart to equation (1).
θM · (1 − θM + θL) − p1 = θM
2 − p2 (6)
Equilibria fall into four categories. When uo is low enough (eg. uo =
−.6), there is a symmetric equilibrium as described in Section 3. In such
an equilibrium, θL = 0 and θM is characterized by equation (6). When uo
is a little higher (eg. uo = −.3), then there is an asymmetric equilibrium
(p1 6= p2) in which everyone drives (Q1 +Q2 = 1).5 When uo is higher again,
4The sign of ∂θi
M/∂p1 + ∂θi
M/∂p2 depends on the sign of ∂u/∂θ. But whether
this eﬀect is overwhelmed by the eﬀect on the other threshold also depends
on this sign. Tabuchi & Thisse (1995) also ﬁnd asymmetric equilibria in some
spatial models, driven by kinked demand curves.
5This second type of equilibrium only arises because the example does not
10there is an asymmetric equilibrium in which some people stay at home, as
described in Section 4. The two thresholds are determined by the intersection
of (6) and the following condition showing indiﬀerence of the person with
θ = θL, between driving ans staying at home.
θL · (1 − θM + θL) − p1 = uo (7)
Finally, if uo is too high, then no-one drives (θL = 1). Bertrand equilibria
can be found numerically. A range of equilibria, for various values of uo, are
presented in Table 1.
Duopoly equilibria are compared with three alternatives, (i) a monopoly
owning both roads, (ii) a private ﬁrm operating one road with the other
road untolled, and (iii) both roads untolled. As in Verhoef & Small (1999),
the eﬃciency consequences of one tolled and one untolled road are very
poor. However, in contrast to Verhoef and Small, the outcomes with a
two-road monopoly are typically more eﬃcient than those with two
untolled roads, except when everyone drives. Furthermore, the
outcomes in a duopoly equilibrium dominate the alternatives in terms of eﬃ-
ciency. Bertrand duopoly generally delivers greater total surplus than either
monopoly or one untolled road, and (usually), a greater surplus than un-
tolled roads. However, Bertrand equilibria are not ﬁrst best eﬃcient even
when some drivers stay at home. Tolls tend to be too high and total utiliza-
tion tends to be too low.
satisfy the assumption that ∂u/∂z < 0 when θ = 0. In such an equilibrium,
there are marginal drivers (at θ = 0) even though everyone actually drives.
Consequently, proposition 2 does not apply. Furthermore, total surplus is not
monotonic in uo over this region
116 Conclusion
The main result of the paper is that vertical diﬀerentiation, a requirement
for eﬃciency, can be expected in a Bertrand equilibrium in a wide range of
cases. However, these cases do not include a totally inelastic total demand
for commutes. While competition is unlikely to deliver full eﬃciency, it can
lead to eﬃciency gains over other decentralized options.
Despite the encouraging results, some caution is in order. First, overall
eﬃciency in a duopoly was only assessed in an example, and the example
was chosen for tractability rather than plausibility. Even so, the encouraging
results are consistent with de Palma & Lindsey (2000), and suggest that the
competitive option may be worthy of consideration where possible.
A second reason for caution is the complexity of duopoly models. Best
response functions are discontinuous when there are some potential drivers
that stay at home. As a consequence, Bertrand equilibria may not exist.
Furthermore, theoretical equilibria may seem more plausible as predictions
when they are simple. Policymakers and private agents may ﬁnd it diﬃcult to
predict outcomes in realistic settings. Perhaps, policymakers should proceed
slowly, until more is known about how roading duopolies function in practice.
12Appendix
A Demand functions at p1 = p2
When p1 = p2, θM is not well deﬁned. The limiting allocations of drivers
as p1 approaches p2 are diﬀerent, depending on whether p1 approaches p2
from above or below. However, both these limiting allocations are possible
outcomes when p1 = p2. Furthermore, every allocation with p1 = p2 has the
same Q1 and Q2. Hence the demand functions are continuous at p1 = p2.
B Slopes of demand functions
Consider subpopulations with uθ > 0, and some non-drivers. θi
H ≡ 1. θi
L and
θi
M are determined by (1) and ui(z1,θi
L)−p1 = u0. As p2 approaches p1 from























































θ ) > 0. In subpopulations
with uθ < 0 and some nondrivers, θi
L ≡ 0, and θi
M and θi
H are determined by
(1) and ui(z2,θi





























































To show that total surplus is not maximised when p1 = p2, we ﬁrst ﬁnd
the best symmetric outcome, i.e., the highest total surplus attainable with a
single price. Let p1 = p2 = p, and z1 = z2 = z, so:








































∂Q dFi. If we let p1 = p2 = p?,

















































Now plug in the comparative statics results from Appendix B. Subpopu-
lations who all drive have ∂θi
L/∂p2 = ∂θi
H/∂p2 = 0, and −∂θi
M/∂p2 < 0. For
subpopulations with uθ > 0 and some non-drivers, ∂θi

























For subpopulations with uθ < 0 and some non-drivers, ∂θi






























Recall from Appendix B that ∆i > 0. Therefore, as ν < 0, total surplus
increases if p2 is raised incrementally from the highest level of total surplus
attainable with a symmetric outcome.
14D Equilibrium
Consider identical roads with p1 ≤ p2. If there was a symmetric equilibrium,
then there should be no incentive to reduce p1 or raise p2, i.e., Q1 +

































But the results of Appendix B show that this is not possible if some peo-





H/∂p2 = 0. Subpopulations with uθ > 0,
and some nondrivers, have ∂θi








z . Finally, subpopulations with uθ < 0, and
some nondrivers, have ∂θi
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